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much briefer than those that follow, and it might have 
been helpful to include a more detailed discussion of 
how the subject’s goals are to be identified. They con-
tinue, in chapter 3, with the next component of their 
approach, the analysis of the cues that are available 
to the subject. These include cues provided by the 
situation, cues provided by the experimenter, cues 
provided by the subject, and cues provided by the 
environment in which the task is performed. Cues 
of the latter sort, which include the recurrence of 
events at predictable intervals, are particularly inter-
esting from the perspective of researchers interested 
in episodic memory, especially those who understand 
episodic memory as a form of mental time travel, for, 
as the authors note, they may play a crucial role in 
the development of the capacity for future- oriented 
mental time travel.
 *ODIBQUFSTBOE)VNQISFZTBOE$IBMNFST
UBDLMFUIFOFYUUXPDPNQPOFOUTPGUIF(PME$*0/T
approach: information and opportunity. Chapter 4 
argues that the information needed to enable the 
subject to perform a task can include both associa-
tions between stimuli and responses and associations 
with memories. Chapter 5 focuses both on how to 
identify the opportunities available to the subject to 
learn the necessary information and the kinds of con-
ditions that either encourage or discourage learning. 
The components discussed in these chapters, Hum-
phreys and Chalmers point out, can be understood 
independently of views about the nature of memory 
TUPSBHF*ODPOUSBTUPVSVOEFSTUBOEJOHPGOPJTFUIF
êOBMDPNQPOFOUPGUIF(PME$*0/TBQQSPBDIPGUFO
depends on our views of memory storage, and chap-
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Humphreys and Chalmers’s stimulating book sets 
out a novel and ambitious approach to thinking about 
human memory. Rather than thinking about memory 
in terms of general memory systems, they argue, we 
should think about it primarily in terms of specific 
NFNPSZUBTLT*OQSBDUJDFUIJOLJOHBCPVUNFNPSZ
in terms not of systems but of tasks requires us to 
break tasks into five components: the subject’s goals 
in performing the task, the cues used by the subject to 
perform the task, the information needed by the sub-
ject in order to perform it, the opportunities available 
to the subject to learn the necessary information, and 
the sources of noise involved in the memory process. 
Humphreys and Chalmers refer to this approach to 
understanding memory in terms of tasks and their 
DPNQPOFOUTBTUIF(PME$*0/TBQQSPBDIGPSgoals, 
cues, information, opportunities, and noise.
 After a short introductory chapter, they devote 
UIFCVMLPGUIFCPPLUPPVUMJOJOHUIF(PME$*0/T
approach, with one chapter dedicated to each of its 
five components. They begin, in chapter 2, with the 
first component, the attempt to determine the goals 
of a task. Although the emphasis in this chapter on 
the fact that the subject’s goals may not coincide with 
those of the experimenter is welcome, the chapter is 
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ter 6 sees the role of noise specifically through the 
lens of a view of storage as distributed or composite. 
#VJMEJOHPOUIFQBSBMMFMEJTUSJCVUFEQSPDFTTJOHBQ-
proach, Humphreys and Chalmers treat memories as 
distributed patterns, assuming that storage of memo-
ries occurs via the superimposition of new patterns 
onto existing patterns. Readers interested in older 
(Sutton, 1998) or more recent (Robins, 2016) debates 
over the implications of distributed views of storage 
for theories of remembering will find this chapter 
particularly rewarding.
 The five chapters on goals, cues, information, op-
portunities, and noise are followed by a chapter on 
how human memory is controlled by the subject, by 
other subjects, and by the environment. The brief 
concluding chapter is preceded by a lengthy chap-
ter on the possibility of defining episodic memory 
and the sources (including problems due to the ex-
istence of both quantitative and qualitative changes 
in memory mechanisms, problems due to interac-
tions between episodic and semantic memory, and 
problems due to the conventional understanding of 
episodic and semantic memory as systems) of the 
difficulty of determining whether nonhuman animals 
and young children have episodic memory. Although 
the heart of the book is undoubtedly constituted by 
UIFDIBQUFSTTFUUJOHPVUUIF(PME$*0/TBQQSPBDI
and although the tone of the chapter on episodic 
memory is somewhat more tentative than that of the 
QSFDFEJOHDIBQUFSTJUJTPOUIJTDIBQUFSUIBU*XJMMGP-
cus, for this review will be published alongside Hum-
phreys and Chalmers’s review of my book, and it is 
in its discussion of the challenge of defining episodic 
memory that their book resonates most strongly with 
my own.
 Although the focus throughout their book is on 
episodic memory, Humphreys and Chalmers empha-
size, at the beginning of chapter 8, that they have 
not yet proposed a definition of episodic memory. 
#ZUIFFOEPGUIFDIBQUFSUIFZBSFOPDMPTFSUPEPJOH
so, but this is not an oversight on their part: Their 
view is that, at present, no satisfactory definition of 
episodic memory is available. The closest we can 
come to a definition, they suggest, is a set of “rules 
of thumb” (p. 164), the presence of features such as 
autobiographical reference, rapid learning, and hip-
pocampal involvement, for determining whether a 
given task should count as an episodic memory task. 
Although their reluctance to offer a definition is not 
unreasonable, the lack of an explicit definition inevi-
tably entails an occasional lack of conceptual clarity 
both with respect to the distinction between episodic 
and semantic memory and with respect to the distinc-
tion between episodic memory and other processes. 
For example, Humphreys and Chalmers repeatedly 
contrast memorial and nonmemorial processes or 
components of systems—even offering, at the very 
end of the book, the involvement of nonmemorial ele-
ments in the performance of episodic memory tasks 
as a reason for replacing the notion of an episodic 
memory system with that of an “episodic problem 
solving system” (p. 199)—but, absent a definition, 
the basis for the classification of certain processes or 
components as memorial and others as nonmemorial 
remains obscure.
 Of course, Humphreys and Chalmers are not 
alone in being reluctant to offer a definition of epi-
sodic memory (Klein, 2015), and their aim in the 
book is certainly not to propose a definition. Never-
theless, it is worthwhile to reflect on what we want 
PVUPGBEFêOJUJPO*OQBSUXIBUXFXBOUJTBNFBOTPG
distinguishing between episodic memory and related 
phenomena. Humphreys and Chalmers focus on the 
distinction between episodic and semantic memory. 
*ONZPXOCPPL	ı
*GPDVTBTJTTUBOEBSEJO
philosophy, on the distinction between episodic 
memory and episodic imagination*OUIFSFNBJOEFS
PGUIJTSFWJFX*EJTDVTTCPUIPGUIFTFEJTUJODUJPOT
'JSTU*TVHHFTUBOFXQFSTQFDUJWFPOUIFEJTUJODUJPO
between episodic and semantic memory on which 
)VNQISFZTBOE$IBMNFSTGPDVT4FDPOE*DPOTJEFS
potential interactions between their treatment of that 
distinction and my treatment of the distinction be-
tween episodic memory and episodic imagination.
 When Humphreys and Chalmers argue that we are 
not in a position to provide a satisfactory definition of 
episodic memory, what they seem to have in mind is 
the difficulty of providing a criterion for something’s 
being an instance of episodic memory, that is, a fea-
ture capable of distinguishing between episodic and 
TFNBOUJDNFNPSZJOBMMDBTFT#VUXIFUIFSBDSJUFSJPO
can be given for a concept depends on what sort of 
concept it is. When dealing with the nature of scien-
tific concepts, philosophers often invoke the notion 
of natural kinds. There is a large technical literature 
on natural kinds, but the basic idea is that natural 
LJOETBSFLJOETUIBUiDBSWFOBUVSFBUJUTKPJOUTu*O
other words, natural kinds group objectively similar 
entities together, and therefore the vocabulary of a 
mature science should consist largely of natural kind 
concepts. Merely nominal kinds, in contrast, group 
objectively dissimilar entities together, and therefore 
nominal kind concepts have little role to play in a 
mature science. The case of jade is a standard ex-
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ample. The term jade was formerly applied to two 
superficially indistinguishable substances, jadeite 
and nephrite. Though superficially similar, jadeite 
and nephrite are objectively dissimilar. The concept 
of jade thus turns out to be a mere nominal kind con-
cept of limited scientific utility.
 Older views of natural kinds tend to take the kinds 
of the physical sciences as their starting point and 
therefore to assume that kinds can be characterized 
JOUFSNTPGUIFGFBUVSFTUIBUBSFFTTFOUJBMUPUIFN*G
kinds are to be characterized in terms of their es-
sential features, then it should always be possible in 
principle to provide a criterion for something’s being 
an instance of a given kind. For example, nothing 
counts as a sample of water unless it is composed 
(primarily) of H2O. However, newer views are cog-
nizant of the fact that as we move from the physical 
to the biological and human sciences, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to identify essential features. 
Rather than understanding kinds in terms of essen-
tial features, these views understand them in terms of 
IPNFPTUBUJDQSPQFSUZDMVTUFST	#PZEı$SBWFS
2009), clusters of properties whose presence tends, 
through the action of an underlying mechanism, to 
DPWBSZXJUIUIFQSFTFODFPGPUIFST*GLJOETBSFDIBS-
acterized as homeostatic property clusters, then it 
will not always be possible to provide a criterion for 
something’s being an instance of a given kind, for a 
given property need not always be present.1
 Episodic memory may be a homeostatic property 
cluster kind. Even if it were impossible to provide a 
criterion for something’s being an instance of epi-
sodic memory, that would not necessarily imply that 
FQJTPEJDNFNPSZJTBNFSFMZOPNJOBMLJOE*OEFFE
the difficulty of providing a definition of episodic 
memory does not prevent Humphreys and Chalm-
ers from being confident that episodic and semantic 
memory constitute “two clusters of phenomena” (p. 
164) and hence that episodic and semantic memory 
tasks may be identified by means of rules of thumb. 
*GFQJTPEJDNFNPSZJTBOBUVSBMLJOEJUNBZXFMMCF
a kind unlike those found in the physical sciences 
and like those found elsewhere in the biological and 
human sciences, in which case such rules of thumb 
are all that can be hoped for. However, rules of thumb 
may amount to a perfectly good definition of a ho-
meostatic property cluster kind. When it comes to a 
phenomenon as complex as episodic memory, it may 
be that the search for a simple criterion is out of place 
and that what is needed is a list of properties (e.g., 
autobiographical reference and rapid learning) that 
tend but need not always cluster together because 
of the action of an underlying mechanism (e.g., the 
hippocampus).
 *PďFSUIFJEFBUIBUFQJTPEJDNFNPSZNBZCFCFTU
understood as a homeostatic property cluster kind 
merely as a suggestion, a potential way of making 
sense of the difficulty of providing a traditional defini-
UJPOUPXIJDI)VNQISFZTBOE$IBMNFSTQPJOU*ONZ
PXOCPPLJOGBDU*EPBUUFNQUUPQSPWJEFBUSBEJUJPO-
al definition, though one designed to distinguish not 
between episodic and semantic memory but rather 
between episodic memory and episodic imagination. 
.PSFQSFDJTFMZ*BQQFBMUPSFTFBSDIPOFQJTPEJDSF-
membering as a form of past- oriented mental time 
travel analogous to forms of future- oriented mental 
time travel such as episodic future thinking (Michae-
lian, Klein, & Szpunar, 2016) to argue against the 
JOëVFOUJBMDBVTBMUIFPSZPGNFNPSZ	#FSOFDLFSı
Martin & Deutscher, 1966), which sees remembering 
as being sharply distinguished from imagining, and 
for an alternative simulation theory that sees remem-
CFSJOHBTBLJOEPGJNBHJOJOH*XJMMSFWJFXOFJUIFSUIF
details of the simulation theory nor my argument for 
JUIFSF#VU*XJMMOPUFUIBUXIFSFBTUIFDBVTBMUIFPSZ
understands the distinction between remembering 
the past and merely imagining it as being due to the 
presence (in the case of remembering) or the absence 
(in the case of imagining) of a specific sort of causal 
link between the subject’s current representation of 
an event and his original experience of it, the simula-
tion theory rejects the requirement of a causal link. 
*OTUFBEJUVOEFSTUBOETSFNFNCFSJOHBTCFJOHBNBU-
ter of imagining the past: A subject “merely” imagines 
the past only when imaging a past event that he or 
she did not experience.
 The simulation theory is offered as an account 
of episodic memory only; that is, it is not meant to 
BQQMZUPTFNBOUJDNFNPSZ#VUUIFDBVTBMUIFPSZ
does apply to both episodic and semantic memory, 
and Humphreys and Chalmers’s discussion of the 
distinction between episodic and semantic memory 
suggests a way of extending the simulation theory to 
semantic memory. The idea would be to start with the 
question of the distinction between semantic memory 
BOETFNBOUJDJNBHJOBUJPO	FH#ZSOF
BOE
then to appeal to work on ways in which beliefs are 
constructed on the fly to undermine the view that 
there is a sharp distinction between semantic mem-
ory and semantic imagination. Rather than seeing 
semantic memory as requiring a causal connection 
with an earlier belief, as in the causal theory, the idea 
would be that no such connection is required, with 
semantic remembering appearing as a kind of se-
AJP 131_1 text.indd   101 1/5/18   11:22 AM
This content downloaded from 129.74.250.206 on Mon, 29 Jan 2018 21:19:43 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 t AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, SPRING 2018
mantic imagining: Just as episodic remembering is 
a matter of imagining an event that was the object of 
a past experience (as opposed to some other event), 
semantic remembering would be a matter of imagin-
ing a proposition that was the object of a past belief 
(as opposed to some other proposition). This would 
amount to a simulation theory of semantic memory.
 *UDBOTPVOEPEEUPTQFBLPGJNBHJOJOHBQSPQPTJ-
tion since when one entertains a proposition, there is 
typically no imagery involved. For this reason, philos-
ophers usually distinguish between episodic imagi-
nation, which has an imagistic or sensory character, 
and cognitive imagination or supposition, which does 
not. (The terminology in this area is unsettled; for 
example, Goldman [2006] distinguishes between 
“enactment imagination” and “suppositional imagi-
OBUJPOu
8IFO*TQFBLPGJNBHJOJOHBQSPQPTJUJPOJU
JTDPHOJUJWFJNBHJOBUJPOPSTVQQPTJUJPOUIBU*IBWFJO
NJOE*GUIFTJNVMBUJPOUIFPSZDBOCFFYUFOEFEUPTF-
mantic imagination in this manner, the question will 
then arise of what the theory implies concerning the 
relationship between semantic memory and episodic 
memory. Two views suggest themselves. First, we 
might treat episodic and semantic imagination—and 
hence episodic and semantic memory—as sharply 
distinct capacities. Second, we might treat episodic 
and semantic imagination—and hence episodic and 
semantic memory—as instances of a common capac-
ity. Although most philosophers treat episodic and 
semantic imagination as distinct capacities, in line 
with the former view, both capacities involve repre-
senting hypothetical states of affairs as if they were 
true or actual (Dokic & Arcangeli, 2015), providing 
some support for the latter view.
 *GUIJTWJFXJTSJHIUUIFOXFXPVMECFMFGUXJUIB
picture on which the common overarching capacity is 
JNBHJOBUJPO*NBHJOBUJPOXPVMEEJWJEFJOUPFQJTPEJD
and semantic types, depending on whether it takes 
events or propositions as its objects. Episodic imagi-
nation would divide into episodic memory and other 
forms of episodic imagination, depending on whether 
it takes experienced past events or other events as 
its objects. And semantic imagination would divide 
into semantic memory and other forms of semantic 
imagination, depending on whether it takes previ-
ously believed propositions or other propositions as 
its objects. (This picture is of course a simplification; 
in practice, memory and [other forms of] imagination 
may interact within a single occurrence of remember-
ing or imagining.)
 Like the idea that episodic memory may be best 
understood as a homeostatic property cluster kind, 
this extension of the simulation theory is offered here 
merely as an idea that would have to be developed 
JONPSFEFUBJMFMTFXIFSFCVU*BNHSBUFGVMUP)VN-
phreys and Chalmers’s stimulating book for having 
provided me with the occasion to begin to explore 
these ideas.
Kourken Michaelian
Department of Philosophy
University of Otago
P.O. Box 56
Dunedin 9054, New Zealand
E- mail: kourken.michaelian@otago.ac.nz
NOTE
 1. There are interesting resonances between the idea of 
homeostatic property cluster kinds and continuous or fuzzy 
BDDPVOUTPGDPODFQUT*UXPVMEUBLFVTUPPGBSBêFMEUPFY-
plore these here, but see Massaro (1989) for background.
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A NEW TYPE OF MEMORY SYSTEM OR AN 
ADDITION TO AN OLD MEMORY SYSTEM?
Mental Time Travel: Episodic Memory  
and Our Knowledge of the Personal Past
By Kourken Michaelian. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016.  
312 pp. Hardcover, $43.
Kourken Michaelian describes his book Mental Time 
Travel: Episodic Memory and Our Knowledge of the 
Personal PastBTBOBDUPGBQQMJFEFQJTUFNPMPHZ*O
chapter 1 the author sets out the three core questions 
addressed by the book. For a psychological audience, 
the restatement of these core questions found in the 
final chapter is more relevant because it succinctly 
sets out the relationship between psychology and the 
philosophical inquiry pursued in this book:
This book has had three main goals: first, to 
provide a general account of episodic remem-
bering, as it occurs in real human beings, consis-
tent with and shaped by the view of remember-
ing as simulational mental time travel that has 
emerged in psychology in recent years; second, 
to provide a general account—again, based on 
the relevant psychology, including research on 
metamemory—of the factors ensuring the reli-
ability of simulational remembering; and finally, 
to provide an account of the evolution of epi-
sodic memory, including the distinctive forms of 
consciousness which characterize it. (p. 237)
 *OUIFTFDPOEDIBQUFSUIFBVUIPSBTLTXIFUIFS
NFNPSZJTBOBUVSBMLJOE#Znatural kind he means a 
category or distinction that exists in nature, although 
as he notes there is no one way of determining what 
constitutes a natural kind. Probably the closest he 
comes to an empirical definition is the idea that if 
memory, or a type of memory, can be identified as 
a natural kind then it will be possible to generalize 
within that natural kind. The approach taken is to 
evaluate memory systems with respect to their simi-
larities and differences in terms of the information 
processing task they perform (the computational lev-
el), the procedure they use to accomplish the task (the 
algorithmic level), and the neurological mechanisms 
used to implement the procedure (the implementa-
tional level). Such an approach is familiar to memory 
researchers, and the author’s take on this issue is both 
informative and properly cautious. We have no quar-
rel with the author’s conclusion that semantic and 
episodic memory are similar in many aspects and 
BSFOPUUIBUTJNJMBSUPQSPDFEVSBMNFNPSZ*OBEEJ-
tion, it also seems likely, as the author concludes, that 
procedural memory and the other forms of what are 
commonly considered nondeclarative memory do 
not constitute a natural kind.
 Nevertheless, we do have some misgivings about 
this approach. First, the computational level theo-
ries that can be proposed for memory systems are 
very different from the computational level theories 
discussed by Marr (1982). The prototypical task dis-
cussed by Marr was deriving shape from shading. 
With this task the physics of light and the optics of 
the eye determine the pattern of retinal activation. A 
mathematical (computational) analysis of how that 
retinal pattern provides information about shape can 
provide strong constraints on algorithmic theories. 
With memory, however, we do not know how the 
input to the task is represented, so the best we can 
probably do is to identify specific tasks, specify the 
inputs and the outputs, and describe in very general 
terms how the inputs can be transformed into the 
outputs (Humphreys, Wiles, & Dennis, 1994). When 
applied to a memory system that performs many dif-
ferent tasks, any computational level theory may be 
so general that it will be of very little use.
 There is also a cost to the attempt to identify 
natural kinds in psychology. Explaining a difference 
between a procedural task such as a finger- tapping 
sequence and an episodic task such as cued recall 
by reference to different memory systems is a very 
weak explanation, as it inherits all the uncertainties 
involved in deriving the idea of there being separate 
TZTUFNT*OBEEJUJPOUIFWFSZFYJTUFODFPGTVDIB
simple explanation for the differences may divert 
attention away from other explanations such as the 
different ways the two tasks are cued. That is, the 
finger- tapping task does not use discrete cues, as in 
the cued- recall task, and the cues that are used for 
finger tapping are inherent within the task (if you 
can perform part of the task you are provided with 
the cues needed to perform the remainder).
 *ODIBQUFS UIFBVUIPSEJTDVTTFT UIFBTQFDUT
from epistemology that the remainder of the book 
will take for granted. For the psychologist this pro-
vides a fascinating insight into issues that are usually 
ignored and to the style of argument used. However, 
there were two aspects to this argumentative style 
that caused us some concerns. First, in a hypothetical 
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